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 INTRODUCTION TO ONE-HUNDRED YEARS                      
OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
JOSEPH M. DODGE*, STEVE R. JOHNSON** & JEFFREY H. KAHN*** 
 Income taxation in the United States got off to a less than auspi-
cious start.1 A few American colonies experimented with taxes that 
crudely attempted to reach certain income from business and profes-
sional activities during the 17th and 18th centuries.2 Secretary of the 
Treasury Alexander Dallas urged adoption of an income tax during 
the War of 1812, but that conflict ended before action was taken on 
his proposal.3  
 Both sides adopted income taxes during the American Civil War.4 
The victorious North repealed its tax shortly after the war ended.5 
About a decade after the tax had been repealed, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the tax in the Springer case.6  
 In 1894, a federal income tax system was again enacted. Especial-
ly compared to what we have now, that tax was a model of simplicity. 
As applied to individual taxpayers, it imposed a flat rate of two per-
cent on any income over $4000.7 A year later, in the famous (or infa-
mous) Pollock decisions, the Supreme Court, effectively overruling 
Springer, struck down the federal income tax as unconstitutional.8  
 In 1909, Congress proposed a constitutional amendment to over-
turn Pollock. This amendment was ratified on February 25, 1913 as 
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 1. For discussion of the early history of taxation in the United States, see JOSEPH M. 
DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & ROBERT J. PERONI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, 
STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 3-11 (4th ed. 2012). 
 2. See generally ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY (2006) 
(discussing tax systems of the American colonies); see also HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED 
STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 1-2 (1979). 
 3. DUBROFF, supra note 2, at 2. 
 4. E.g., Act of August 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309; Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 
119, § 89, 12 Stat. 432, 473; Tax History Museum: 1861–1865: The Civil War, TAX ANA-
LYSTS, http://www.taxhistory.org/www/website.nsf/Web/THM1861?OpenDocument (last visit-
ed Feb. 1, 2014) (describing Confederacy income tax). 
 5. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257. 
 6. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (holding that the Civil War income 
tax was not subject to the requirement, imposed by Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the U.S. 
Constitution, that a federal “direct tax” had to be apportioned among the states in propor-
tion to population). 
 7. Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553. 
 8. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aff’d on reh’g, 158 U.S. 
601 (1895) (holding that the income tax, in taxing income from property, was a non-
apportioned direct tax).  
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 the Sixteenth Amendment, which provides: “The Congress shall have 
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source de-
rived, without apportionment among the several States, and without 
regard to any census or enumeration.” Shortly after the ratification of 
the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 
1913 and, thus, the modern federal income tax was born.9 
 Few events have been more important in shaping contemporary 
American life than the creation and development of the income tax. 
“No other branch of the law touches human activities at so many 
points” as does income tax law.10 Income tax considerations bear on 
marriage, children, home, work, and the numerous other activities, 
transactions, and decisions fundamental to life. Income tax planning 
is crucial to businesses large and small. The modern welfare-defense-
regulatory state would be impossible without the enormous and pre-
dictable flows of revenues provided mainly by the income tax. 
Whether the effects of the federal income tax are desirable can be 
debated. The pervasiveness of these effects cannot be. 
 Thus, whether as celebration or lamentation, the centennial of the 
modern federal income tax is an occasion to mark. To do so, we at 
Florida State hosted an array of distinguished experts who offered 
perspectives on what we have learned in the last 100 years and 
where we should (or will) go in the future. Joining us for the occasion, 
as principal presenters and as commentators, were Steven Bank, Jo-
seph Bankman, David Gamage, James Hines, Jr., Douglas Kahn, 
Leandra Lederman, Gregg Polsky, Clarissa Potter, Chris Sanchirico, 
Daniel Shaviro, and Lawrence Zelenak. Although they need no      
introduction, their institutional affiliations are listed at the end of 
this Introduction. 
 We convened on March 1 and 2, 2013. Eight original articles and 
essays examined historical developments, current features, and fu-
ture possibilities as to the federal income tax. First, authors present-
ed their work, then designated commentators offered their perspec-
tives, then all conference participants participated in rich and free-
wheeling debate. The pieces appearing in this symposium issue were 
enriched by this stimulating discussion. 
 Beginning this symposium issue, Professor Daniel Shaviro ex-
plores The Forgotten Henry Simons. Simons is a household name 
with tax scholars on account of his well-known definition of personal 
income as the “algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exer-
cised in consumption and (2) the change in value of the store of prop-
erty rights between the beginning and end of the period in ques-
 9. Act of October 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. Previously, the federal government 
had enacted a corporate income tax. Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. The 
Supreme Court upheld the corporate income tax as a uniform “indirect” tax in Flint v. 
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911). 
 10. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1943). 
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 tion.”11 This definition of personal income, now referred to as the 
Haig-Simons definition, is still used as a standard and remains im-
portant in modern tax scholarship. 
 Professor Shaviro explores the man behind the definition. He pro-
vides a brief overview of Simons’ “meteoric” career. The article then 
moves to a discussion of the seemingly contradictory nature of some 
of his opinions. Simons described himself as “severely libertarian.” 
He generally denounced government economic regulation and was 
the intellectual leader of the pro-free market law and economics 
movement at the University of Chicago Law School. Yet he also was a 
proponent of “drastic progression” in a broad-based income tax. Pro-
fessor Shaviro explores these apparently contradictory views and  
attempts to explain why Simons may have held them. Finally, while 
acknowledging that Professor Simons favored an income tax system 
over a consumption tax system during his lifetime, Professor Shaviro 
attempts to discern what Professor Simons might think today on  
that issue. 
 In When We Taxed the Pyramids, Professor Steven Bank explores 
the dividends received deduction.12 This deduction allows a corpora-
tion to deduct from its income an amount equal to a certain percent-
age (or all) of the dividends that it receives from other domestic cor-
porations. The article examines the historical development of the de-
duction to explain how we ended up with the current tax treatment of 
such dividends. Professor Bank focuses on the original purpose for 
taxing intercorporate dividends, which was to discourage the for-
mation of corporate “pyramids” or groups of corporations controlled 
by one parent holding corporation. These structures were viewed as 
abusive and facilitated the concentration of too much wealth and 
power in a small group of owners. 
 The article explores the political shift in attitude over time regard-
ing the concern of multi-level corporate groups and the gradual ac-
ceptance of the pyramid structure. Professor Bank uses the fall and 
rise of the corporate consolidated return to illustrate this shift of 
opinion. This leads us to where we are today, with a dividends        
received deduction for corporations that does not appear to fulfill    
any policy rationale. Professor Bank concludes the article by propos-
ing reforms that would better align the treatment of intercorporate     
dividends with the policy justification for allowing a deduction for 
such income.  
 The individual income tax has increasingly grown more complex 
over its 100-year history. In Some Income Tax Simplification Pro-
posals, Professor Joseph Dodge presents explanations of how com-
plexity has come about, while offering reasons why simplification, 
 11. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).  
 12. I.R.C. § 243.  
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 especially for individual and small-business taxpayers, has merit. 
Professor Dodge then offers an array of simplification proposals, bro-
ken down into one list of proposals that do not entail significant re-
form from the policy perspective and a separate list of commonly 
mentioned reform proposals that would also advance the cause of 
simplification. The lists are not exhaustive; for example, simplifica-
tion of capitalization doctrine and capital recovery methods (includ-
ing depreciation) is not considered. 
 Many simplification proposals made by Professor Dodge are aimed 
at low to moderate individual taxpayers. For example, the taxable 
income computation could be simplified by eliminating the different 
treatment of various categories of deductions. Low-income allowances 
could be simplified by eliminating the separate rate schedules for 
unmarried individuals and heads of household, plus collapsing the 
existing standard deduction, personal exemption, and dependency 
exemptions into a single subsistence deduction based on family size. 
Similarly, the earned income credit, the child credit, and the house-
hold and dependent care credit could be combined into a single de-
pendent-care allowance for the working poor. Another type of simpli-
fication entails elimination of (1) subjective tests, (2) assorted fact-
intensive inquiries, (3) meaningless distinctions, and (4) pointless 
computations. Along these lines, the definition of “dependent” could 
be simplified by eliminating “support” tests, the Duberstein definition 
of “gift”13 could be replaced by the gift tax definition of gift,14 depreci-
ation (and basis adjustments) could be disallowed on business or in-
vestment use of personal residences, the distinction between tax ali-
mony and child support could be abolished, and various borderline 
personal-business costs could be disallowed. Ranging further afield, 
Professor Dodge floats notions of cash accounting for small business 
(including avoidance of inventory accounting), portfolio accounting 
for publicly traded securities held by an individual, and simplifica-
tion of the income tax rules involving gratuitous transfers, grantor 
trusts, and estates. Also considered are various reform proposals per-
taining to capital gains, the personal deductions, and the horrendous-
ly complex system of taxing retirement income deferrals.  
 In A Proposed Replacement of the Tax Expenditures Concept and a 
Different Perspective on Accelerated Depreciation, Professor Douglas 
Kahn revisits the debate on tax expenditure budgets, a concept that 
he has previously criticized.15 The tax expenditure concept rests un-
easily on the premise that there is an “ideal” income tax system and 
 13. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960) (defining gifts ex-
cludible from income taxation as transfers animated by the donor’s “detached and disinter-
ested generosity” (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956))). 
 14. See I.R.C. § 2512(b) (defining gifts by reference to the extent by which the value of 
the transferred property exceeds consideration rendered for the transfer). 
 15. Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 
54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992).  
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 that any departures from that ideal system should be scrutinized to 
see if they are justified. In this essay, Professor Kahn contends that a 
major flaw in the tax expenditure concept is its view that the current 
tax provisions can be divided into two camps in black and white 
terms. That is, a provision either is a departure from the ideal sys-
tem or it is within the system; there is no middle ground. To the con-
trary, Professor Kahn contends that the tax system is too sophisti-
cated for such a crude classification to be appropriate. Instead, he 
maintains that the tax system should be analyzed under a more dif-
ferentiated multivariate standard.  
 Professor Kahn reviews the tax law's allowance of depreciation 
deductions as an example of the flaws in the tax expenditure concept. 
Taxpayers generally must capitalize business costs for items that will 
be used for more than one year (in contrast to deducting those costs 
immediately). The system for annually deducting a portion of the cost 
is referred to as depreciation. There has been much debate over the 
question of how the amount of depreciation deductions should be de-
termined. Current tax law permits an accelerated method of depreci-
ation (i.e., greater amounts deducted in the earlier years of use of the 
item) for some properties. One of the government's tax expenditure 
budgets treats depreciation in excess of what would be allowed under 
the straight-line method as a tax expenditure. Professor Kahn adopts 
an approach that shows that acceleration is not per se inconsistent 
with normal tax principles, but he does emphasize that his conclu-
sion does not mean that accelerated depreciation is the proper system 
to employ.  
 In The End of Cash, the Income Tax, and the Next 100 Years, Pro-
fessors Jeffrey Kahn and Gregg Polsky take the occasion of the in-
come tax centennial to question how future technology might improve 
tax compliance under the income tax system, although they note that 
such technology ironically may also signal the end of the income tax. 
Professors Kahn and Polsky propose that future technological ad-
vances in payment systems may shrink the cash economy down to an 
immaterial size. They suggest that such a world would lead to an in-
crease in tax compliance since the government would easily be able to 
track income transfers between taxpayers, which should lead to in-
creased tax compliance. The shrinkage of the tax gap would make the 
income tax system more efficient, thereby strengthening the system. 
 Those same technological advances in payment systems also could 
lead to the demise of the income tax. For a variety of reasons, many 
economists and policy experts advocate the move from an income   
tax system to one that focuses more intently on consumption. One 
difficulty with such a move is the inability to introduce significant      
progressivity to such a system. Widespread and exclusive electronic 
payment systems, however, could change that and allow the         
government to tailor a consumption tax system with progressive 
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 rates, thereby leading to the end of the income tax system that we 
celebrate today. 
 Professor David Gamage’s contribution to the symposium—On the 
Future of Tax Salience Scholarship: Operative Mechanisms and Lim-
iting Factors—builds on his earlier work, with Professor Darien 
Shanske, that reviewed the developing literature on tax salience.16 
“ ‘Tax salience’ ” refers to how the presentation of tax prices affects 
taxpayer behavior. In other words, tax salience measures how tax-
payer behavior departs from key assumptions of neoclassical econom-
ic theory.”17 Professor Gamage’s hope is that such analysis will fur-
ther aid the development of scholarship and policymaking in the ar-
ea. While he concedes that the body of literature is not quite there 
yet, Professor Gamage believes that the area will soon be developed 
enough to provide substantial policy recommendations for our federal 
income tax system. 
 Appropriately, most of the attention of this symposium is directed 
at the substantive rules of federal income taxation, the policies be-
hind them, and the alternatives to them. But procedural rules—the 
provisions governing resolution of controversies as to the meaning 
and application of the substantive rules—also are part of the story of 
the first 100 years and of the foreseeable future. 
 Professor Steve Johnson takes a panoramic look at the procedural 
rules in Reforming Federal Tax Litigation: An Agenda. He identifies 
12 key events and trends—statutory, regulatory, and judicial—that 
have shaped the current federal tax procedure and collection regimes. 
He finds that four sets of values have driven these events and trends: 
providing remedies for taxpayers and third parties that are both fair 
and perceived to be fair, protecting the revenue, achieving decisional 
consistency, and promoting process efficiency, reducing costs, and 
reducing delays. 
 Applying these criteria, Professor Johnson proposes an array of 
reforms to federal tax litigation, as to available fora, available forms 
of action, and prerequisites to suit. His recommendations include ex-
panding the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to give it nearly plenary civil tax 
jurisdiction, abolishing the Court of Claims’ tax jurisdiction, abolish-
ing nearly all of the so-called TEFRA partnership audit and litigation 
regime, revising (though not abolishing) Collection Due Process hear-
ings and litigation, and facilitating tax refund suits by allowing tax-
payers to sue after paying only part of assessed liabilities (instead of 
having to pay the full assessment as a precondition of suit). 
 The symposium issue concludes with Professor Larry Zelenak 
speculating on the question of whether Florida State University Col-
lege of Law will hold another tax symposium in the year 2113 “cele-
 16. David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience 
and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011).  
 17. Id. at 19. 
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 brating” the 200th anniversary of the federal income tax. That is, will 
the income tax survive for another 100 years? In Will the Federal In-
come Tax Have a Bicentennial?, Professor Zelenak argues that the 
income tax system is defined by more than just its base. He notes 
that there are several defining features of the income tax that have 
nothing to do with its base. Believing that many of these features will 
remain intact, even if the income base changes, leads Professor 
Zelenak to conclude that it is arguable that the public would still 
consider our system to be an income tax—that is, that the label “in-
come tax system” has become broader than just the income base. If 
true, it is likely that Florida State University College of Law will be 
issuing an all-digital, holographic symposium issue in 2113 celebrat-
ing (or lamenting) another 100 years of the income tax.   
 We at Florida State are deeply grateful to all the conference par-
ticipants for their enthusiasm and insights. We present the articles 
and essays in this symposium issue in the hope and belief that they 
will stimulate further thought and debate as the United States em-
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